

THE DUAL ALLIANCE UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE THEORY OF ALLIANCE DILEMMA: A STUDY CENTERED ON MACEDONIAN REFORMS (1903-1908)

Gao Jianzhi³⁵

International Studies Institute, National University of Defense Technology, Nanjing, China; School of Marxism, Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine, Nanjing, China
gao_103103@163.com

DOI: 10.52837/27382702-2024.4.1-88

Abstract

The Dual Alliance was an important achievement of Germany's proactive diplomacy, which eliminated the hidden security risk of Austria-Hungary's fall to the hostile countries, and restored Germany's position of restraining the Austro-Russian relations and its position as a mediator between the two countries. Austria-Hungary improved its relatively fragile position as a Great Power in Europe through the alliance, but at the cost of its foreign policy that was to some extent subject to Germany's control. The Dual Alliance was in a dilemma at the very beginning. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary had the fears of "abandonment" and "entrapment", and there were the risks of détente and conflict with hostile countries. In order to improve the internal relations of the alliance, the Austria-Hungary took advantage of Macedonian reforms to adopt a proactive foreign policy. In order to maintain the stability of the alliance, Germany repeatedly supported the policies that carried out by Austria-Hungary at critical moments in the process of Macedonian reforms to show its loyalty to the ally. The relationship between Germany and Austria-

The article was submitted on July 10, 2024. The article was reviewed on August 06, 2024.

Hungary in the alliance gradually changed, which in turn pushed the Austria-Hungary to implement a more aggressive foreign policy.

Keywords: Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Dilemma, the Dual Alliance, Macedonian Reforms, Diplomatic Games.

Introduction

The Dual Alliance was the result of a proactive diplomacy in which Germany attempted to establish a system of European states under its control after the Congress of Berlin, when the Concert of Europe was deeply divided, the Three Emperors' League was no longer in place, and German-Austrian relations were in a state of extreme instability [2: 212]. The Dual Alliance, as the first cornerstone in the construction of the deadly and conflicting alliance system that led to the outbreak of the First World War, the first of a series of secret treaties that divided the European Great Powers into two hostile camps, was one of the long-term causes of the outbreak of the First World War [15: 54].

For a long time, academic research mostly focuses on the background of the establishment of the Dual Alliance and its relationship with the Otto von Bismarck's alliance system, while the discussion of the changes in the internal relationship of the alliance is less involved. In fact, the Dual Alliance was plagued by alliance dilemmas from the very beginning: both Germany and Austria-Hungary were worried about being "abandonment" and "entrapment" by each other, and there was a risk of *détente* and conflict with hostile countries or alliances. In addition, the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary within the alliance gradually changed due to the influence of many factors, and continued until the eve of the First World War.

This paper intends to apply Glenn H. Snyder's theory of alliance dilemma, combined with the archives of Britain, France, Germany and other countries, to conduct a case study on the diplomatic game of the Great Powers around the Macedonian reforms, to analyze in depth the gradual change of the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary within the alliance due to

deepening of the Macedonian reforms process. It also explains why the foreign policy of Germany, as a stronger party in the alliance, was gradually “implicated” by the weaker Austria-Hungary and became a staunch supporter of the alliance, which greatly affected the adjustment of the relationship among the Great Powers before World War I and contributed to the outbreak of the First World War.

The Establishment of Alliance: The Explanatory Power of Alliance Dilemma Theory on the Dual Alliance

As one of the important contents of international relations, alliance theory has experienced the research process of classical realism, neorealism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism, and its content is constantly being enriched and deepened. Among them, the theory of “alliance security dilemma” put forward by Snyder is of great significance for the academic research on alliance theory. According to Snyder, alliances and coalitions, as one of the most central phenomena in international politics, mainly refer to formal alliances of countries on the use or non-use of force for the purpose of safeguarding the security or expanding the power of member countries, which are directed against other specific countries [5: 104]. The security dilemma between allies mainly refers to the fact that, in order to avoid being “abandonment”, a country needs to support its allies in order to gain the latter’s trust, and this kind of strengthening of alliances may arouse the hostility of hostile countries, thus increasing the risk of being “entrapment”. If one country chooses to weaken the alliance in order to avoid the rise of hostile countries’ hostility, the result may be that the country avoids being “entrapment” by its allies, but it also increases the risk of being “abandonment” by the allies and of condoning the expansion of hostile countries.

According to Snyder, the security dilemma in the alliance game is divided into two stages. The first stage occurs during alliance formation. In a multipolar system, countries have the choice to enter into alliances or to renounce them, and the motivation for a country to adopt an alliance policy is

either to significantly increase its security through alliances if other countries abandon them, or to avoid isolation and prevent cooperating countries from entering into an alliance against itself. The main purpose of each country's accession negotiations is to be in the strongest alliance and to maximize its share of the net benefits of the alliance, which are the so-called national interest. National interests are categorized into general interests and special interests. General interests stem from the anarchic structure of the system and the geographical location of the country, which do not involve a conflict with a specific country and are also called strategic interests because of the importance attached to their function and security contents. Special interests refer to conflict or intimate relations with specific countries, stemming from ideology, ethnicity, economy or prestige. National interests help to reduce the uncertainty of the architecture. During alliance negotiations, national interests become an important factor in the alliance bargaining process.

The second stage occurs after the formation of the alliance. At this stage, a country's choices are about how loyal it is to its allies and how much support it can provide them in its interactions with an adversary in a particular conflict. Snyder uses the concepts of "abandonment" and "entrapment" from Michael Mandelbaum's analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons on international politics to illustrate the results of the internal game among allied countries. The logic of "abandonment" is that a country fears betrayal by its allies, including: re-alignment with rivals, unilateral dissolution of alliance, abrogation of alliance agreements, inability to fulfill explicit commitments, and failure to provide support in the event of a contingency that requires it. Among them, the suspicion that its allies are contemplating realignment may motivate it to realign before its allies do [6: 466-467]. The logic of "entrapment" is that a country is drawn into a conflict because of the interests of its allies that the country cannot or only partially share. Alliances often have divergent interests, and "entrapment" occurs when a country believes that the value of preserving the alliances is more important than the cost of fighting for the interests of the allies. "Entrapment" is more likely to occur when the allies are

uncompromising with the adversary because of their trust in their supporters. The more dependent a country is on the alliances, the stronger its commitment to the alliances and the higher its risk of being “entrapment”. The risks of “abandonment” and “entrapment” tend to be inversely proportional, that is, reducing one risk will increase the other. Therefore, the strategic choice for resolving the alliance security dilemma needs to weigh the costs and risks of “abandonment” and “entrapment” [6: 467].

The degree of a country’s dependence on an alliance, the differences in strategic interests between the allies, the degree of clarity of alliance agreements, and the degree of benefit-sharing between the allies in conflict with an adversary are the four determinants of benefits, costs and risks. First, the more dependent a country is on the alliance and the less dependent its allies are on the alliance, the greater the costs and risks of the country being “abandonment” than of being “entrapment”; second, differences in strategic interests help explain why the most powerful country in an alliance often has little influence over its allies, especially when the strategic interests of the more powerful country are well known, and it cannot credibly threaten its allies not to resort to a policy of betrayal or renegotiation; then, unclear alliance agreements tend to maximize a country’s fear of “abandonment”, but make it less likely that it will be “entrapment” by its allies, whereas clearly defined agreements minimize the fear of being “abandonment”, but increase the risk of being “entrapment”; finally, if the allies share similar interests in a conflict with an adversary, the risk is minimized, but if allies share very different interests, the country that shares fewer interests will not only worry about pulling the chestnuts out of the fire for others, but also worry about whether allies will take a firm stand in support of it if its interests are threatened [6: 472-474]. Thus, if a country feels a high degree of dependence on its allies and a low degree of dependence on itself, the alliance agreements are ambiguous, the allies’ recent behavior suggests that their loyalty is questionable, it will fear being “abandonment” rather than “entrapment”. To ameliorate the dilemma, the country will reaffirm its commitment to its allies, choose to support them in their games with their adversaries and avoid

cooperation with allies' adversaries [6: 475].

In the alliance security dilemma, the alliance game and the adversary game are carried out simultaneously, and the strategies and tactics adopted in the alliance game have a direct impact on the adversary game. In the adversary game, a country taking a tough stance against the adversary can play a role in consolidating the alliance, but it will also increase the risk of being "entrapment" by the allies, because the allies may become uncompromising towards the adversary due to its support, which will also reduce the country's ability to bargain with the allies in the alliance game and the option of re-establishing an alliance with the adversary will not be realized. If a country adopts a cooperative strategy with its adversary, it can reduce the risk of being "entrapment" by the allies, because the allies observe the country's improving relations with its adversary that increase their concern about whether the country will stand firmly behind them in a possible crisis. Consequently, allies will be more cautious in playing with their rivals, and may become more submissive in order to prevent themselves from being "abandonment" by the country. However, cooperation with an adversary can also increase the risk of being "abandonment" by allies, who may preemptively re-align alliances. In addition, cooperation with an adversary may have a "falling domino effect", in which the adversary perceives the country's cooperation as a sign of weakness and pushes the adversary to be more assertive in its dealings with each other [6: 470-471]. Furthermore, in the adversary game, taking a firm stance in the belief that the other has potentially aggressive motives increases the insecurity spiral. A country that reduces the concerns of its allies by taking a strong stance against its adversary also increases cooperation between the adversary and its allies, and the insecurity spiral rises when both alliances take a firm stance. Thus, the increased internal solidarity of one alliance, as well as a rise in the insecurity spiral in the game with the adversary, increases the cohesion of the other alliance [6: 477-478].

During the formation of the Dual Alliance, both countries had the autonomy of choosing their allies, and there were several reasons for Bismarck to take the initiative to conclude the alliance.

Firstly, Bismarck was dissatisfied with Russia's attitude towards Germany. The Tsar had complained that the Congress of Berlin was a European Union organized under the leadership of Bismarck against Russia, that the intention of German policy was intended to benefit Austria-Hungary [16: 3]. Although Russia fully understood Germany's intention to maintain good German-Austrian relations, Germany could not do so at the expense of German-Russian relations [16: 15-16]. The Three Emperors' League had brought not gains but disadvantages to Russia [16: 7]. Bismarck refuted this by saying that Russia had gained a great deal from the Three Emperors' League and instead of being grateful, it resorted to threats of war, which was unacceptable to Germany [16: 18]. In a conversation with the French ambassador to Germany, de Saint-Vallier, Bismarck indignantly remarked that Russia was not only threatened German ambassador to Russia in the unofficial newspapers, in the official telegrams, but also threatened war, this was the reason for signing the Vienna Settlement. Russian policy towards Germany had changed, and the old friendship had been replaced by an unusual degree of Russian jealousy and distrust [23: 580-581]. Since the War of German Unification, the friendly German-Russian relations had drifted apart, and the possibility of arch-enemy France seeking Franco-Russian amity in Europe to get rid of its isolation would have made Germany's situation more difficult. Therefore, concluding an alliance with Austria-Hungary, controlling the development of Austro-Russian relations, forcing Russia to back into the camp of the Three Emperors' League, and maintaining Germany's position as the dominant power on the European continent was an effective way. Bismarck's real purpose was to prevent the Austro-Russian conflict by means of Austria-Hungary dependence on Germany, so that it could at the same time prevent the mutual destruction of the two autocracies [31: 72]. The Dual Alliance concluded in 1879 was not intended to prepare for a military conflict with Russia; on the contrary, its purpose was to demonstrate political power in order to bring Russia to the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and thus to secure peace in Europe [22: 91].

Secondly, Bismarck believed that Germany and Austria-Hungary were

closely linked in terms of ideology, national history and other aspects, which helped the two countries to forge a strong alliance. Bismarck had stated that there was more in common between Germany and Austria-Hungary than between Germany and Russia. The Germanic races were closely related in terms of blood ties, historical memories, and language, etc., which helped the German population to be more inclined to enter into an alliance with Austria-Hungary and to believe that an alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary would be more durable than an alliance between Germany and Russia [16: 20]. Therefore, when Germany had to choose an ally between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Austria-Hungary should be chosen [12: 35]. In addition, Germany and Austria-Hungary had memories of friendly relations. After the Austro-Prussian War, Prussia did not punish Austria severely, and in return, Austria-Hungary gave up the opportunity of allying with France to take revenge on Prussia during the Franco-Prussian War, and chose to maintain strictly neutrality. This fond memory provided an emotional bond for the two countries to conclude the alliance.

Finally, Bismarck feared that Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was moving in a direction unfavorable to Germany. In 1879, Bismarck learned that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Andr ssy, who had supported the maintenance of friendly relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, was about to leave his post, and he feared that this might signify that Austro-Hungarian policy would shift to an alliance with Russia or even France [2: 212]. In order to avoid isolation or the conclusion of an alliance against Germany by Austria-Hungary, Bismarck decided to remove this danger and speed up the process of concluding an alliance between the two countries. In persuading Kaiser Wilhelm, I to conclude an alliance as soon as possible, Bismarck stated that if the alliance was rejected, Austria-Hungary would sooner or later seek an alliance with France and Russia, and then Germany would have to face the danger of being isolated on the continent by the alliance between Russia, France and Austria-Hungary. The less powerful Austria-Hungary, which Germany despised, could be enlisted by Russia to counter Germany, and the loss of its ally would leave Germany open to attack by Russia, which, if

victorious over Germany, would dominate Eastern Europe and the Near East with its power [16: 80].

For Austria-Hungary, the Dual Alliance was directed against Russia [41: 378]. It was essentially an anti-Russian tool rather than a German-led anti-French tool. Austria-Hungary believed that it should stay away from all situations involving Franco-German conflict and, above all, refrain from any policy that would enhance the relationship between the Three Emperors' League and not jeopardize the partnership between Austria-Hungary and Britain and France [2: 213]. Andrassy had explicitly stated that the Dual Alliance was the tombstone of the old Three Emperors' League, not a stepping stone to a new one [15: 58]. Moreover, Germany, as the new hegemon of continental Europe, entering into an alliance with it would help to improve Austro-Hungarian declining Great Power status since the Austro-Prussian War, as well as to increase the discourse of Austria-Russia in the struggle for dominance in the Balkans.

In short, the estrangement of German-Russian relations since the Congress of Berlin, the bad German-French relations due to the Franco-Prussian War, and the isolationism of Britain, made Germany, which had fewer choices of allies, attach great importance to Austria-Hungary, with which it had special interests in terms of ideology, racial composition, and economic interoperability. As a result, Germany's initiative of alliance appeared to be stronger than Austria-Hungary's. Throughout the contents of the Dual Alliance, Germany's responsibility to defend Austria-Hungary could not be compared with Austria-Hungary's responsibility of defending Germany, and Germany made more commitments [32: 123-124]. Austria-Hungary, which had been on good terms with Britain and France before its alliance with Germany, was more selective in its alliances than Germany, and thus did not value the Dual Alliance as much as Germany did, and even questioned it slightly. For example, Rudolf Franz Karl Joseph, Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary, argued that the Dual Alliance was contrary to the best interests of the dynasty and the country, that Bismarck harbored ambitions to use the alliance to carry out the annexation of the Germanic provinces of Austria-Hungary, and that Austria-

Hungary should be allied with Britain and could not side with Germany in carrying out its anti-French policies [13: 274-275]. Bismarck himself confessed that Austria-Hungary neither proposed nor sought an alliance with Germany, and Germany's idea of having Austria-Hungary on its side against attacks from France was repeatedly rejected by Austria-Hungary [16: 118]. Therefore, Germany dominated the formation of the alliance by virtue of its great power, but there was a clear difference in the degree of reliance on the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany attached more importance to the alliance than Austria-Hungary, and even after Bismarck's departure, the alliance served as the cornerstone of Germany's diplomacy [41: 356].

After the establishment of the Dual Alliance, the internal game of the alliance and the adversary game coexisted, and both countries were at risk of being "abandonment" and "entrapment". Germany was afraid of being involved in the Austro-Russian conflict, facing the dilemma of an alliance between Austria-Hungary, Britain and France. De St. Vallier stated that with the dissolution of the Three Emperors' League, Germany aimed to reduce Austria-Hungary to a satellite role in its policy by aligning itself with the latter, and that neither Britain nor any of the other Great Powers would be allowed to become a third party to the Dual Alliance [24: 71]. Thus, for Germany, the Dual Alliance served a dual purpose: on the one hand, Germany could use the alliance to restrain Austria-Hungary from provoking Russia in the future. On the other hand, if the restriction failed, Germany had to secure the support of Austria-Hungary in the face of a Russian attack [37: 37]. Although Austria-Hungary feared that German-Russian coordination would limit its expansion in the Balkans, it was more concerned about being "entrapment" by Germany in the German-French conflict. In order to maintain its diplomatic flexibility, Austria-Hungary told France that there was no need to worry about the intentions of the Dual Alliance as it was not directed against France, and France was satisfied with Austria-Hungary's statement [24: 11-12]. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary were highly dependent on the alliance, yet there were differences in their strategic interests. Germany's strategic interest as the dominant power in the alliance was to maintain its continental

supremacy while avoiding a two-front war between East and West. Austria-Hungary's strategic interests were to improve its fragile great power status, maintain friendly relations with Britain and France, and compete with Russia for dominance in the Balkans. According to A. J. P. Taylor, the Dual Alliance was the result of Bismarck's efforts to prevent Austria-Hungary from seeking support from Britain and France, and to provide a stable basis for Habsburg foreign policy [39: 155]. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister stated that Germany would take Austria-Hungary's interests into account to the greatest extent possible in all Eastern questions [24: 251]. In addition, the clarity of the German-Austrian alliance agreement and the obvious differences in the shared interests of the two countries put both countries at risk of being "entrapment".

At the beginning of the twentieth century, as the Balkans, which were not covered by the German-Austrian alliance agreement, became an arena for the Great Powers to play their diplomatic games, the differences in German and Austro-Hungarian governance on the Near East gradually affected the transformation of the status of the two countries within the alliance.

The Trade-off between being "Abandonment" and being "Entrapment": the Austro-Italian Disagreement over the Reform of the Gendarmerie and Germany's Choice

In February 1903, the Austro-Russian "Vienna Scheme" for the Macedonian issue, which involved the appointment of an inspector general and the reorganization of the gendarmerie, etc., marked that the Macedonian issue had become a European issue [7: 51-53; 26: 115-118]. In October of the same year, the Austro-Russian "Mürzsteg Programme" was formulated with an even broader scope [9: 96-98]. Since then, the Great Powers engaged in a series of diplomatic games around the Macedonian reforms, which contributed to the fragmentation of interests and the reorganization of power of the relevant countries, including the transformation of German-Austrian relations and status within the alliance.

The building of a strong gendarmerie was a guarantee of security, stability and social order in Macedonia and a prerequisite for other reforms

undertaken by the Great Powers. The British Ambassador in Constantinople stated that no provision of the Mürzsteg Programme was more important than the reorganization of the Gendarmerie. A very difficult task can be accomplished only with the support of the Gendarmerie, and if the Gendarmerie was not able to provide practical help, the implementation of the reform program would be impossible [9: 156]. On the issue of the reorganization of the Macedonian Gendarmerie, the Great Powers disagreed on who would be responsible for the reorganization and on the partition of the Macedonian region.

The British proposed an Italian general to reorganize the gendarmerie, but Austria-Hungary disagreed. Austria-Hungary argued that the decision on the choice of personnel should rest with the Turkish Empire [9: 157]. The reasons for Austria-Hungary's position were: firstly, Austria-Hungary wanted to maintain the Austro-Russian domination of the Macedonian reforms and did not want to cede this power to a third country; secondly, the reorganization of the gendarmerie by an Italian general would tend to tilt the Macedonian reforms in Italy's favor, facilitate the expansion of Italy's power in the western Balkans, and harm the interests of Austria-Hungary in the region. Finally, giving the right to appoint a foreign general to the Turkish Empire would not only allay its persistent fears of interference by the Great Powers in its internal affairs, but also win Austria-Hungary the goodwill of the Turkish Empire, which in turn would serve to gain more rights and interests in the future.

Germany was pleased to see Austro-Russian cooperation in the Balkans. Germany stated that it had no other interest in the Near East than the maintenance of peace, and was satisfied with its position in the second or third tier. If Austria-Hungary and Russia were to support the British proposal, Germany would not object it [9: 151-152]. Later, through British efforts, Austria-Hungary finally agreed that an Italian general would be responsible for reorganizing the gendarmerie. Britain's behavior won the favor of Italy, while Austria-Hungary's needs were constrained. Although Germany wanted to stay out of the reform issue, with the active involvement of Austria-Hungary in the reform, Germany was "entrapment" by its ally and could not stand alone.

On the case of the partitioned occupation of Macedonia, it was not only a measure of the Six Great Powers' intention to take advantage of the reforms to strengthen their respective positions in Macedonia, but also a manifestation of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers in the Balkans, with the Austro-Italian conflict being particularly prominent.

Austria-Hungary was deeply concerned about the expansion of Italian power in the Balkans. Agenor Maria Goluchowski, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, stated that Italy harbored greed for Albania as well as a desire to interfere in everything [27: 442]. Calice, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Constantinople, believed that Italy was seeking to occupy Monastir (Macedonia had three provinces: Monastir in the west, Kosovo in the north, and Salonica in the south), because of its proximity to Albania and it could become the headquarter of Emilio Degiorgis (who was in charge of reorganizing the gendarmerie). If further gendarmerie battalions were established in the region, Italy would be able to do whatever it wanted, and this was not allowed by Austria-Hungary. The best choice for the Italian occupation would be Serres in the province of Salonica, with the British occupying Monastir instead [19: 102]. Austro-Hungarian opposition to the Italian occupation of Monastir was based on the following considerations: it was believed that the reorganization of the gendarmerie by Italy would help Italy to increase its influence in western Macedonia and Albania. Once Italy controlled the entire Adriatic Sea, it would block Austria-Hungary's sea trade routes. In addition, the exclusion of Italian influence in the Western Balkans would facilitate the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Üskub (Skopje) adjacent to the Serbian border, which would not only allow for the monitoring of Serbian policy, but also link up with Novibazar, blocking Serbia's alliance with Montenegro in the western sector, and thus facilitating the advancement of its own power into the Salonica and even the Aegean region. "In view of Austria-Hungary enjoying garrison rights in Novibazar, this was able to embed a wedge between the two Serbian states (meaning Serbia and Montenegro), severing Serbia from the Adriatic completely and opening up forward routes to Salonica and the Aegean Sea, something that the Austrian imperialists haunted" [33: 111].

Italy's opposition to Austro-Hungarian expansion into the southern Balkans, coupled with the existence of a marriage union between Italy and Montenegro, led Italy, whose power extended into Albania and Macedonia, to hope to secure its control over Albania by occupying the Monastir region in western Macedonia. Tommaso Tittoni, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, said that Italy would have to occupy the Adriatic coast in order to protect its interests in case of an Austro-Hungarian military offensive in the Balkans. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Empire, in his analysis of the Austro-Italian relations, stated that at this moment the relations between the two countries were in danger and that Austria-Hungary would never allow Italian officers to be sent to the Albanian settlements [19: 108-109]. In order to achieve its aim of containing the power of Austria-Hungary, Italy actively sought the support of Britain and France. Tittoni mentioned to the French ambassador in Rome that, given Austria-Hungary's tendency to play a dominant role in the Balkans, it was hoped that France and Italy could reach a consensus and work together to prevent such a possible outcome [27: 409]. France showed its support for Italy by rejecting the Austro-Hungarian proposal for a partitioned occupation [27: 431]. Britain, on the other hand, was firmly in favor of Italy, hoping to use the opportunity to disrupt Austro-Italian relations and thus break up the Triple Alliance. This made it extremely difficult to reach an Austro-Italian consensus on Macedonian reforms. Britain stated that if Austria-Hungary insisted on the partition of Üskub, this would be opposed by Italy, and Britain would support Italian possession of Monastir [27: 454-456]. Russia, trapped in the war in the Far East, supported Austria-Hungary in the division of the occupation zone, but agreed in principle that Austria-Hungary's power should extend only to the province of Kosovo and not to Salonica. In the end, Britain, France, Russia and Italy reached a consensus on the issue of limiting the expansion of Austria-Hungary, and Austria-Hungary could only rely on its ally Germany.

Germany's position is particularly important at this time. On the one hand, Austria-Hungary and Italy were both allies of Germany, and thus Germany was caught in a dilemma when both countries sought its support. Given the need

to maintain the stability of the Dual Alliance and the need to harmonize the differences among the Triple Alliance in order to avoid its disintegration, Germany's dilemma was that choosing one side might be detrimental to the interests of the other. On the other hand, Germany was reluctant to get too involved in the Balkans to avoid intensifying its conflicts with Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy. Bismarck had mentioned several times that Germany was unwilling to waste a single Pomeranian bombardier in the Balkans [38: 263]. However, in the face of the aggravation of the Austro-Italian differences, it became inevitable that Germany, which was in urgent need of easing the relationship between the two allies, would be "entrapment" in the Balkans. However, in order to satisfy the demands of the two allies, Germany finally came up with a compromise that supported the Italian occupation of Monastir and met Austria-Hungary's demand to exclude the Albanian region from the reform of the gendarmerie.

On the issue of gendarmerie reform, Germany's choice was more or less hopeless. As the dominant power in the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance, Germany was in principle less dependent on the alliance than Austria-Hungary and Italy from the point of view of power alone, but as Austria-Hungary invested more and more in the reform of the Macedonian gendarmerie, Germany, for the sake of maintaining the cornerstones of its foreign policy, had to do its utmost to avoid the situation of being "abandonment" by the ally. After all, Austria-Hungary had a far greater choice of allies than Germany. Moreover, at the end of the nineteenth century, Italy began to negotiate with its former enemy, France, for the conclusion of a commercial treaty and the possibility of political cooperation [20: 276]. In November 1902, France and Italy concluded the Entente, which weakened the position of the Triple Alliance in Italy's foreign policy. Even if the Triple Alliance had been renewed, it could not have prevented the Franco-Italian approach. Italy had assured France that it would not sign any military agreement or treaty involving a German attack on France [36: 91]. The French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé stated that there was no need for the French government to ask for explanations and assurances from the Italian government on the renewal of the Triple Alliance,

as Italy's loyalty was unquestionable [20: 335]. The reorganization of Italy's foreign policy made it less dependent on the Triple Alliance than in the past, and Italy had the right and the possibility of "abandonment" the Alliance at any time, which was obviously less important to Germany than the Dual Alliance at this time. Moreover, Germany chose to support Austria-Hungary diplomatically because of the stimulus brought by the coordinated action of Britain, France, Russia and Italy. Germany feared that if the four Great Powers were to act together, the space for its diplomatic activities would be greatly reduced. Under the combined effect of the alliance game and the adversary game, Germany, after weighing the "abandonment" and "entrapment", chose the Dual alliance as well as the Balkans, where Austria-Hungary's interests were at stake.

The Trade-off between "Abandonment" and Self-interest: The Contest over the Austro-Turkish Fiscal Reform and Germany's Choice

The reorganization of the Macedonian gendarmerie was a prerequisite for ensuring regional stability, while the stability of the Macedonian finances and the perfect order were the guarantees for the proper functioning of the administrative and judicial system [10: 4]. The fiscal reform program was first proposed by Russia, and then jointly developed by Austria-Hungary and Russia, and implemented by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was mainly controlled by the French [19: 205].

German-Turkish relations had been slowly moving in a friendly direction since the Congress of Berlin. The Treaty of Berlin dismembered Greater Bulgaria, placed Macedonia back under the rule of the Turkish Empire, Eastern Rumelia became autonomous, Russian expansion on the Black Sea and in the Balkans was limited, and although the Turkish Empire was no longer a de facto Great Power, at least it prevented the expansion of Russian power into the Balkans and preserved the Turkish Empire's temporary stability and the prestige of the Sultan. Germany's original intention was not to preserve the Turkish Empire, but its behavior objectively won the latter's favor. Thus, when Germany attempted to develop its power in the Turkish Empire, the

Turkish government and the Sultan responded by encouraging Germany to develop a friendly influence within its borders. The Turks believed that the Germans would provide protection from the Great Powers, would allow the Turkish Empire to continue its domestic reforms, and would eventually become strong enough to survive without the protection of the Great Powers [30: 132-133].

With Britain's decision to limit further financial intervention in the Turkish Empire, the Germans realized that they could facilitate the development of German interests in the Turkish Empire by means of trade, commerce, and peaceful penetration [30: 127]. In 1888, the Deutsche Bank made the first major loan to the Turkish Empire. For Germany, the loan was intended to facilitate the entry of the Deutsche Bank into the financial sphere of the Turkish Empire, and it would also enable the Deutsche Bank to quickly rise to a position comparable to, if not higher than, that of the Imperial Ottoman Banks [30: 144]. According to statistics, from 1888 to 1913, German investments in the Turkish Empire rose from £166,000 to £20,653,000. These investments were in the fields of railways, ports and public works construction, banking, industry and mining. Among them, Germany had the greatest impact in railways and ports construction as well as banking investments [35: 64-66].

As German-Turkish economic ties grew closer, so did German political influence in the Turkish Empire. In 1895, when British Prime Minister Salisbury proposed to the Kaiser a division of the Turkish Empire to solve the Eastern Question, the Kaiser was not only lukewarm, but also believed that it would be better to support the Turkish Empire and to allow the Sultan to carry out appropriate reforms for the protection of his Christian subjects [17: 109-111]. At this time, Germany had already shown gestures of developing friendly German-Turkish relations. In 1898, against the backdrop of the Turkish Empire's oppressive policy against the Armenians and the support of numerous anti-Turkish Empire organizations by the major European Great Powers, especially Britain and France, the Kaiser became the first head of a European Great Power to visit the Turkish Empire and convey a message of

support for the Sultan's regime. Bernhard von Bülow recalled that during his visit to the Turkish Empire, the Kaiser assured His Majesty the Sultan and the 300 million Muslims who regarded him as their caliph that he would always be their friend, no matter where on earth they lived [3: 254]. Behind the improved relations between the two countries was Germany's intention to expand its influence in the Turkish Empire.

Furthermore, the relationship between Germany and Ottoman Turkey was further brought closer as there was a good basis for cooperation in the military field. On the one hand, Germany sent several military delegations to the Turkish Empire to help modernize the latter's military system. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and Otto Liman von Sanders were the most prominent members of these military missions. For example, during his tenure in the Turkish Empire, Goltz served as the army inspector of the Turkish Empire and an instructor at the war college, established friendships with some of the key leaders of the Turkish Empire, trained a large number of officers, and established a formal staff college, and so on. Goltz had expressed his satisfaction with his work by stating that after the reforms of the German officers, the Turkish army was ready to help the Germans in the war and to ensure the survival of their country in the war, if not its revival [30: 191-192]. On the other hand, the process of reforming the Turkish Empire according to the German military model created a new class of officers, who had close relations with German instructors. Many Turkish officers believed in the German military doctrine and intended to rely on the German military model and power to reconstruct their own weak military system, and their admiration for Germany led to the latter's great influence in the political and military spheres of the empire, Germany gradually assumed the role of protectorate of the Turkish Empire [30: 197-199].

Thus, as German-Turkish relations continued to develop and intensify since the Congress of Berlin, Germany realized that the Turkish Empire was its necessary ally, and that without this collaborator Germany could neither compete with Britain and Russia in the Orient and Asia, nor obtain the benefits it desired [33: 127]. Therefore, when the Macedonian fiscal reform was put on

the agenda, Germany was caught in a dilemma of choosing between Austria-Hungary and the Turkish Empire. In order to avoid being “abandonment” by the ally, Germany mostly chose to support Austro-Hungarian claims. At the same time, Germany hoped to gradually change the passive situation of being “entrapment” by Austria-Hungary in the Near East, and to enhance its own voice in the alliance, so as to become a party guiding Austria-Hungary’s policy making. In view of maintaining the deepening German-Turkish relations, Germany put many obstacles in the way of Macedonian financial reform in order to protect the interests of the Turkish Empire and minimize the latter’s losses.

In order to better balance the Austro-Turkish relations and to increase its voice in the Macedonian reforms, Germany changed its negative attitude during the reorganization of the gendarmerie and became “more proactive on the issue of fiscal reform. The main reasons were as follows:

First, Germany believed that the Imperial Ottoman Bank, an institution run by the French, was in competition with German enterprises in the Turkish Empire, and thus did not agree to give the Imperial Ottoman Bank any more fiscal control. Second, Germany feared that the Austro-Russian dominated model of international control had the potential to be extended to other provinces of the Turkish Empire, jeopardizing the latter’s national interests and increasing the intensity of the latter’s resistance to the reform process [19: 207-214]. Third, if fiscal reform under international control were inevitable, Germany needed to take its place in the soon-to-be-established finance committee and try its best to play a leading role in the fiscal reform. Mühlberg, Undersecretary of State at the German Foreign Office, claimed: “If international fiscal control is to be exercised over Macedonia, we need to consider the possibility of extending such control over the entire Turkish Empire, and Germany must insist on a seat on the finance committee.” [19: 216] Fourth, the contradictions among the Great Powers provided the conditions for Germany to undermine the Concert of Europe. First of all, Britain opposed the Austro-Russian fiscal reform program, arguing that it could result in local Macedonian authorities with insufficient funds for regional

development and the payment of salaries to public officials [7: 76]. In addition, Britain stated that the Austro-Russian program gave too much power to the representatives of Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Turkish Empire in charge of fiscal reform, who were not financial experts, and therefore Britain would not support the Austro-Russian resolution until it fully understood the program [10: 16]. Secondly, Italy was dissatisfied with the fact that Austria-Hungary and Russia had not consulted it before proposing the reform, and believed that the two countries had acted without taking Italy's interests into account, and therefore wanted the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin to appoint representatives to supervise the fiscal reform together with the Austro-Hungarian and Russian representatives, with the intention of transforming Macedonian reforms from Austro-Russian domination to co-management by the Great Powers [19: 206]. Italy had proposed to Britain that the situation in Macedonia was critical and that it was important for the Western Great Powers to agree on concerted action [28: 79]. Again, France hoped to use its opposition to the Austro-Russian reform program as an opportunity to mediate Anglo-Russian relations. On the one hand, on the grounds of maintaining friendly French-Turkish economic relations, France indicated that it did not want the Imperial Ottoman Bank to be responsible for Macedonian fiscal reform in order to negate the Austro-Russian reform program [19: 224]. On the other hand, France reminded Russia that the continuation of the present predicament in Macedonia would only be conducive to the expansion of Austro-Hungarian influence [28: 79]. Germany and Austria-Hungary might take advantage of Russian internal and external difficulties to seek hegemony in the Balkans, and that Austria-Hungary, as an instrument of German policy, pursued policies in the Balkans and the Near East that were strictly Germanic in nature. Therefore, France had every reason to frustrate the Austro-German policy in certain ways [28: 79-80]. Lastly, Russia, distracted by the Russo-Japanese War, intended to shift her diplomatic center of gravity to the Near East in order to get out of the dilemma in the Far East. Russia had declared that it would "never abandon the Christians of Macedonia" [19: 234]. Russia was prepared to formulate a financial commission consisting of Austro-Russian

representatives and one financial expert from each of the other Great Powers as the basis of a new program of fiscal reform, tired of having Austria-Hungary play a dominant role in the Balkans and its own subordinate role [19: 248].

In view of the change in Germany's attitude, Austria-Hungary also began to consider adjusting its strategy towards the Turkish Empire. Austria-Hungary believed that although it had maintained good diplomatic relations with Britain and France for a long time and both of them were potential allies that it could strive for, the Franco-Russian alliance had already been concluded, and France was pushing for a *détente* between Britain and Russia, while Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy had irreconcilable contradictions in the Balkans, as well as Britain was trying to internationalize the Macedonian reforms and break Austro-Hungarian dominance in the matter of the reforms, these factors forced Austria-Hungary to pay attention to the reality that its ally Germany's intention to develop German-Turkish friendship. Goluchowski, in criticizing the British proposal to internationalize the reforms, stated that the British move would only anger the Turkish Empire and increase its resistance, as well as encourage a desire for rebellion in the Macedonian region, which would ultimately hamper the reform program being implemented by Austria-Hungary and Russia [28: 87-88]. France also analyzed Germany's behavior and stated that Germany's reluctant support for the Austro-Russian reform program was obviously to win the favor of the Turkish Empire, yet its behavior was in no way driven by sympathy for the Turkish Empire, but was merely a manifestation of its desire to maximize its own gains [28: 153-154].

Despite Austria-Hungary's fear of being "abandonment" by Germany, with the development of the Concert of Europe towards pressuring the Turkish Empire to accept the fiscal reform program, Austria-Hungary and Russia took the opportunity to propose a new reform program. Fearing "abandonment" by its ally, Germany, after weighing the importance of the Dual Alliance against German-Turkish interests, chose to support Austria-Hungary rather than the Turkish Empire. Germany indicated to the Turkish Empire that some of the initial clauses involving infringement of the latter's sovereignty had been eliminated under its influence, that it was certain that the other Great Powers

would not agree to abandon the proposal for the establishment of a finance committee, and that if the Turkish Empire rejected the proposal, the Great Powers would probably make further demands [19: 258]. In the end, the Turkish Empire, which had lost the support of Germany, was forced to accept the Austro-Russian fiscal reform program under the coercive measures of naval demonstrations taken by the Great Powers.

In short, the change in Germany's attitude before and after the fiscal reform showed that the deepening reform had jeopardized its interests in the Turkish Empire. Germany changed its policy of staying out of the gendarmerie reform and became actively involved in the process of fiscal reform in order to increase its own voice in the process, to improve its unfavorable situation in the alliance, and to reshape its dominance in the alliance politics. In fact, Germany was facing with the dilemma of choosing between Austria-Hungary, Italy and the Turkish Empire. In the alliance game, Austria-Hungary had a stronger sense of autonomy, and Germany more often took a supportive position, which made its diplomatic flexibility greatly reduced. The fact that Italy coordinated its actions more often with Britain, France, and Russia than with Germany and Austria-Hungary further aggravated Germany's worries. The Italian prime minister told Bülow that Italy would be spiritually loyal to the Triple Alliance, rejecting French advice to leave, but would not strain Franco-Italian relations, which were not in Italy's interests [4: 57]. In addition, although the Turkish Empire, as a potential ally, was more inclined to take the initiative to cooperate with Germany, Germany more often than not took the option in favor of Austria-Hungary due to the great divergence in German-Turkish strategic interests. In the adversary game, the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance, the Anglo-French Entente, and the diplomatic isolation in the First Moroccan Crisis reinforced Germany's concern about its own environment. Bülow had analyzed that the world was currently filled with hostility, hatred, and envy toward Germany: Britain's dislike and envy of Germany had not been eliminated; France's vengeful ideology was still alive and hoped to revive its European hegemony; Russia's anti-German tendency toward democratic revolution was high; Italy would always be an uncertainty;

and Austria-Hungary would be forced to deal with its own internal problems for a long time to come [4: 218-219]. This unfavorable international environment forced Germany to weigh the “abandonment” of the ally against the growing interests of Germany and the Turkish Empire. In the end, the fear of “abandonment” led Germany to choose the Dual Alliance.

Being “Abandonment” beyond being “Entrapment”: the Austro-Russian Dispute over Judicial Reform and Germany’s Choice

The Macedonian judicial system was characterized by its imperfections, lack of clarity of competences and internal contradictions [40: 301]. In view of this, the growing dissatisfaction of the Christian population with the existing system, the judicial reform was put on the agenda.

The judicial reform program was first proposed by Russia for the following reasons: First, after the Russo-Japanese War, in order to get rid of the domestic pressures brought about by the loss of the wars in the Far East, the Near East and the Balkans again became the center of Russian intrigues and aspirations [4: 163]. Second, the replacement of the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople with someone less knowledgeable of Macedonian affairs facilitated Russia’s acquisition of dominance over the judicial reform. Third, Russia hoped to use the opportunity of judicial reform to improve relations with Britain and France, to gain financial support from both countries, and to alleviate the domestic political crisis. Fourth, the Russian officers in charge of reorganizing the Macedonian gendarmerie repeatedly reported that the Turkish imperial judiciary had released the guilty and convicted the innocent people, which aroused the discontent of the Christian population [19: 403]. In order to continue its role as protector of Christians, Russia needed to take the initiative in judicial reform.

Austria-Hungary changed its positive attitude towards the Macedonian reforms and reacted to the Russian proposal in a lukewarm manner. The main reasons for this were: First, despite a certain degree of Austro-Russian cooperation over the reorganization of the gendarmerie and fiscal reforms, there were irreconcilable structural contradictions between the interests of

the two countries in the Balkans. Second, the anti-Austrian government established after the Serbian coup d'état of 1903 intensified the Austro-Serbian rivalry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which reduced Macedonia's position in Austria-Hungary's foreign strategic deployment. Third, Austria-Hungary wanted to make some concessions to the Turkish Empire on the issue of judicial reform in order to seek more rights and interests in the future, which included the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, Germany's attitude on Macedonian reforms influenced the adjustment of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. Germany expressed a desire to leave more initiative in the matter of judicial reform in the hands of the Turkish government, to give the Sultan sufficient time, and not to put further pressure on him [19: 404]. Finally, the drawbacks of the dual rule model of Austria-Hungary became increasingly apparent as an important factor limiting its foreign policy, which in turn weakened its position on judicial reform [8]. It can be said that the establishment of the dualism became a permanent obstacle to systematic change in the Empire [1: 12].

At a time when Austro-Russian cooperation on judicial reform was being severely tested, Germany was also caught in a dilemma. With a constant sense of encirclement and concern for competition with its neighbors, Germany's national policy was to reduce the pressure on its eastern borders so that it would be free to deal with its other European neighbours [14: 4]. In 1887, Bismarck, in order to please Russia and continue to play the role of Austro-Russian coordinator, replaced the unsustainable Three Emperors' League with the German-Russian Reinsurance Treaty. However, the Reinsurance Treaty aroused the suspicion of Austria-Hungary, was detrimental to the stability of the Triple Alliance and did not necessarily lead to a permanent understanding between Germany and Russia [37: 73]. As a result, the treaty was soon abrogated in the context of Bismarck's fall from power in 1890 and Germany's implementation of a new diplomatic line. An atmosphere of mistrust developed between Germany and Russia, and it was from this moment that Russia began to turn to France [11: 177].

The establishment of the Franco-Russian alliance was the inevitable result

of the suspicion and dissatisfaction of the two countries towards Germany and their feeling of isolation [36: 66]. It was also the product of Germany's miscalculation of the international situation and its diplomatic choices. These reasons made Germany realize that it might be caught in the dilemma of fighting on two fronts in the future. In order to change this unfavorable situation and consolidate the existing alliances, Germany took advantage of the contradictions between Britain and Russia, Japan and Russia to dismantle the Franco-Russian alliance and strive for the return of Russia to Germany's diplomatic orbit. Bülow had told the Kaiser that Germany had already torn up the German-Russian treaty, and that the Russian government, based on the sentiments of the domestic population, was not prepared, let alone to formally sever the alliance with France in order to ally with Germany again. It was impossible to put back together what Germany had broken in 1890, but it was feasible for Germany to achieve, through a steady and skillful policy, the goal of promoting peace and increasing friendship between the two countries [4: 59].

In the first place, Germany strongly encouraged Russian action in Asia and prevented Austria-Hungary from taking any action in Europe that would provoke Russia [11: 192]. On the one hand, Germany told Russia that it would not allow anyone to hinder the latter's operations and would be responsible for securing Russia's back in Europe from attack [11: 203-204]. On the other hand, Germany hoped that the intensifying contradictions between Japan and Russia would lead to the fulfillment of Russia's demands. Bülow told the Japanese Ambassador to Germany that he would not intervene in the Russo-Japanese conflict, and that there was not a single agreement between Germany and Russia concerning East Asia. If a conflict broke out between Japan and Russia, Germany would remain strictly neutral. Indeed, Germany would not undermine Japanese self-confidence and initiative because a war in the Far East would eliminate the potential danger of war for Germany in Europe [3: 618]. Germany's move was intended to free Japan to compete with Russia and to help Russia when it was deep in the quagmire of the Far East.

Secondly, Germany was proactive in negotiating cooperation with Russia with the intention of playing the role of a counterweight. Bülow suggested to

the Kaiser that it would be a great mistake to allow Russia to bring Germany to the forefront as a buffer against Japan and even Britain in German-Russian relations, and that Germany should be careful to avoid such a danger [3: 62]. The Treaty of Björkö, signed secretly in July 1905 after a long exchange between the Kaiser and the Tsar, was one of the manifestations of the restoration of the traditional friendship between the two countries. In the Kaiser's view, the establishment of a Triple Alliance between Germany, France, and Russia, even if it did not directly create a favorable military advantage for Russia in East Asia, would serve as a check on Japan's behavior [18: 438]. Although the treaty was later abrogated due to excessive opposition from both Germany and Russia and Russia's reduced dependence on Germany after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Germany and Russia did not cease their attempts to establish friendly relations. While the negotiations for a German-Russian friendly understanding were deepening, Austro-Russian contradictions on the issue of judicial reform were becoming increasingly apparent, and Germany was once again left with a dilemma of choice.

In January 1907, Austria-Hungary and Russia sent a joint draft of judicial reform to the Turkish government, which, in order to avoid further erosion of its sovereignty, draw up a plan for the improvement of the Macedonian judicial system [19: 409]. Austria-Hungary welcomed the move as a favorable opportunity for the Turkish Empire to exercise its autonomy. In May 1907, Austria-Hungary told Russia that it hoped that Russia, France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary would support the reform program of the Turkish Empire, and that under the influence of the Concert of Europe, even Britain and Italy which were in disagreement, might reach a consensus with Austria-Hungary [40: 51-52]. Russia, while recognizing the great success of the cooperation between the two countries in improving the situation of Macedonian Christians, was skeptical about the possibility of winning the support of the more conflicted France and Germany. Russia believed that delaying the judicial reform might provoke discontent among the Macedonian Christians, and supported the British proposal for implementation of the reform program immediately [40: 55-57]. In June, Russia presented Austria-Hungary with a

final plan for the reorganization of the judicial system. The plan recognized the differences between the Muslim and Christian judicial systems; completely rejected Austro-Hungarian attempts at Austro-Russian domination of the judicial reform, accepting instead the co-management of the Great Powers; and strengthened the role of the finance committee in the issue of judicial reform. Austria-Hungary modified the Russian plan by suggesting that the Turkish government should be given full authority to choose the officials responsible for the judicial reform, and that these officials, once appointed, should be absolutely protected by law against dismissal by the Turkish government [40: 59-61]. In essence, Austria-Hungary's move was aimed at winning the favor of the Turkish Empire and improving relations between the two countries in order to pave the way for its eventual annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Russia insisted on its position in the original draft reform and said that if Austria-Hungary did not compromise on the issue, it would be left to the ambassadors of the Great Powers in Constantinople to decide [40: 61-63]. In addition, Russia actively sought the support of Britain. Britain, for its part, based on its global strategic interests, realized that the rising Germany was attempting to disrupt the existing power structure, and that the European balance of power, as well as the broader geographic balance of the British Empire, had been upset by the emergence of Germany, which had become a competitor rather than an ally both in Europe and abroad. The desire to restore the balance of power necessitated adjustments in the empire's foreign relations that would reduce its vulnerability [14: 9]. The internal and external difficulties of Russia after the Russo-Japanese War rendered her incapable of posing a substantial threat to British interests in the Far East and Central Asia, and with the mediation of France, Britain gradually improved her strategic concern for Russia. Thus, in the face of Russia's overtures on the issue of judicial reform, Britain indicated that it would stand firmly by Russia and seek to develop the relationship between the two countries in the direction of concluding the entente [19: 419; 29: 235]. Germany lamented the rapid development of Anglo-Russian relations, "no trace of Russian distrust of

Britain could be found.” [19: 413] At this point, the Austro-Russian domination of Macedonian reforms since the Vienna Scheme was broken, the co-management of the Great Powers became a *fait accompli*. The mutual political trust that Britain and Russia accumulated during the process of Macedonian reforms contributed to the two countries eventually conclude an agreement to adjust their colonial differences.

In view of the friendly cooperation between Britain, France, Russia and Italy on the question of Macedonian juridical reform, and in order to win Russia's support on the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to restore the prestige of the Empire, to free itself as far as possible from its dependence on Germany, and to carry out a more autonomous foreign policy, Austria-Hungary decided to support the Anglo-Russian reform proposal. Austria-Hungary stated to Germany that if the Turkish Empire rejected the Anglo-Russian proposal, it would have the most serious consequences and jeopardize its sovereignty, it would be wise to accept the Anglo-Russian proposal in a friendly manner. [19: 450] Germany expressed its deep surprise at the change in the attitude of Austria-Hungary. Germany stated that the Turkish government would accept the Anglo-Russian program only under extreme pressure, otherwise it would be resisted by the Turkish side. In order to support Austria-Hungary, Germany had already supported all the measures taken by Austria-Hungary and Russia, but Austria-Hungary in return supported the Anglo-Russian proposal, which was bound to put Germany in a dilemma and jeopardize German-Turkish relations [19: 451-453]. In addition, the analysis of the situation by the German ambassador in Constantinople made Germany realize the severity of the circumstances in which it found itself. According to the ambassador, judicial reform had become the touchstone in the current relations among the Great Powers: Britain had acquired a leadership role that was not its own; France had clearly expressed its support for Britain so as not to jeopardize the Entente with Britain, even if the British proposals were directly contrary to French interests; Italy was reluctant to leave the ranks of the British followers and repeatedly emphasized that it would do everything in its power to persuade Austria-Hungary and

Russia to accept the British proposals; Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, as a novice, was entirely at the mercy of the experienced Russian Ambassador in the preparation of the reform program, and to some extent voluntarily yielded to Russian influence; since the signing of the Anglo-Russian Entente, the British influence on Russian foreign policy decisions had been very great, and the Anglo-Russian position on the question of the judicial reform tended to be the same. In view of this, the relations between the ambassadors of Constantinople created a situation of confrontation between Germany and the other five countries, and Germany was in the awkward position of insisting on the Concert of Europe or maintaining friendly relations with the Turkish Empire [19: 453-455].

In the end, Germany agreed to make concessions on the issue of judicial reform, said that it would act in coordination with the other Great Powers and recommended that the Turkish Empire should accept a joint note from the Great Powers. In 1908, Austria-Hungary announced the implementation of the Novibazar Railway Project, which temporarily eased Germany's dilemma on the issue of judicial reform. However, with another international crisis caused by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, Germany was not only "entrapment" in the new crisis, but also became more determined than ever to support its ally.

All in all, since the establishment of the Franco-Russian alliance, Germany realized it was in a dilemma of fighting on two fronts. In order to get out of such an unfavorable situation, Germany took advantage of the conflicts between Britain and Russia, Japan and Russia, and made many attempts to restore the traditional friendship between Germany and Russia. In the Macedonian reforms, Germany had always supported the principle of the Austro-Russian-led reforms, with the intention of maintaining the stability of the Austro-Russian Entente concluded in 1897 and re-establishing the Three Emperors' League. However, with the intensification of the Austro-Russian differences over judicial reform, the synergy of Britain, France, Russia and Italy, and Austria-Hungary's desire to promote an Eastern policy that would lead Germany rather than be led by Germany, Germany, deeply isolated, fell

into the fear of being “abandonment” and “entrapment” by the ally [34: 174]. On the one hand, Germany needed to restrain Austria-Hungary from pursuing an offensive foreign policy in the Balkans, to avoid the risk of the Near East problem, and to avoid being “entrapment” by the ally in the dilemma of bad relations with Russia. On the other hand, the negotiation of understanding between Germany and Russia had become extremely difficult because of the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia. If Germany chose to remain loyal to its ally, it would not only mean that its efforts to improve German-Russian relations would be in vain, but also contribute to the consolidation of the relations between Britain, France, and Russia, thus worsening the environment around it. If Germany chose to continue her attempts to restore friendly relations with Russia, it would provoke resentment from Austria-Hungary and jeopardize its loyalty to the alliance, even worse, Austria-Hungary might choose to “abandon” Germany and cooperate with Britain and France. Therefore, with the Triple Entente a fait accompli, Germany could only choose to continue to support Austria-Hungary’s Balkan policy in order to avoid isolation, and this firm support for the alliance in turn reinforced Austria-Hungary’s pursuit of a more offensive foreign policy.

Looking at the Macedonian reforms process, it can be found that the dilemma that existed at the beginning of the establishment of the Dual Alliance became more and more obvious at this time. Austria-Hungary used the Dual Alliance to pursue a proactive foreign policy in the Balkans with the intention of acquiring more imperial rights and interests. In the alliance game with Austria-Hungary and the adversary game with Britain, France and Russia, Germany, out of loyalty to the alliance obligations, avoided being “abandonment” by the ally as well as self-isolation of the dilemma, and was constantly “entrapment” in the Near East affairs by the ally. When faced with Austro-Italian, Austro-Turkish, and Austro-Russian differences, Germany could only choose to side with Austria-Hungary. Germany’s increasing dependence on the alliance and the clarity of its strategic interests led to a gradual change in the relationship of priority within the alliance. Austria-Hungary, rather than Germany, slowly became the guiding force in the direction of alliance policy.

Conclusion

In order to ensure the maximization of national interests since the reunification, to continue to isolate France, and to control the Austro-Russian relations, Germany chose to conclude an alliance with Austria-Hungary, with which it had a strong geopolitical, ideological, and racial connection. Austria-Hungary, in turn, wanted to serve to limit rival Russia through its alliance with Germany. There was a marked difference in the dependence of Germany and Austria-Hungary on the alliance, as Germany had always regarded the alliance as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, while Austria-Hungary had greater diplomatic autonomy. After the establishment of the alliance, both Germany and Austria-Hungary were troubled by the idea of being “abandonment” and “entrapment”. Germany tried hard to mediate the Austro-Russian conflict and avoid getting involved in the conflict between the two countries. Austria-Hungary did not want the alliance to become a tool for Germany to pursue its interests against France and to limit its diplomatic autonomy.

With the establishment of the Franco-Russian Alliance, in order to avoid a two-front war, Germany intended to restore the friendship between Germany and Russia, encourage the reconciliation between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and revive the Three Emperors’ League. With the strong support of Germany, the Austro-Russian Agreement was signed in 1897, in which the two countries agreed to maintain the balance of power in the Balkans with the aim of achieving peace in the region [32: 164]. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the internationalization of the Macedonian issue led to a complex diplomatic game of Macedonian reforms among the Great Powers. Austria-Hungary and Russia initially dominated the Macedonian reforms, and Germany was pleased with this situation. However, as the reform process progressed, Austro-Italian differences over the reform of the gendarmerie, Austro-Turkish rivalries over fiscal reform, and Austro-Russian contradictions over judicial reform emerged, and Germany was gradually caught in a dilemma of choice. Austria-Hungary and Italy were both allies of Germany, and no matter which side it favored, it would be hated by the other side. Although Germany appeased the two allies with a compromise plan,

considering Italy's close relationship with Britain and France, Germany preferred Austria-Hungary in its future choices. Germany had great political, economic, and military influence in the Turkish Empire, and the latter had always sought friendly relations with Germany. However, on the issue of Macedonian reforms, despite the fact that Germany had repeatedly put-up obstacles to block the reform process and safeguarded the interests of the Turkish Empire, when it was necessary to choose between Austria-Hungary and the Turkish Empire, Germany mostly chose to stand on the side of the ally. Germany had been trying to restore friendly relations with Russia, but as the Austro-Russian conflict in the Balkans intensified, Germany finally gave up the idea of German-Russian détente in favor of Austria-Hungary.

In the course of Macedonian reforms, the primary and secondary relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary in the alliance changed significantly. As Austria-Hungary sought to eliminate the dependence of the Dual Monarchy on Germany, to maintain Austria-Hungary at the forefront of the European powers, and to vigorously pursue an expansionary Near Eastern policy, Germany was already deeply "entrapment". Germany's fear of being "abandonment" by the ally was evident in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909. Bülow stated that there was no need for Germany to kick Austria-Hungary directly into the hostile camp, and that Germany would always stay together on the issue of Bosnia according to the treaty of alliance, and that Germany would never abandon Austria-Hungary [4: 332]. After the change in German-Austrian relations, the Austro-Hungarian press excitedly stated that, after a long period of neglect, Austria-Hungary had now risen to its feet in Europe and had become a real Great Power with its own foreign policy in the future, that the European Great Powers would have to consult it on international issues [21: 303]. Austrian Chancellor Bienerth also stated that Austria-Hungary had for a long time irrefutably accepted the assertion that the Dual Monarchy existed only because of a European necessity, but after the Bosnian Crisis this contemptuous notion of Austria-Hungary should be discarded and the Dual Monarchy was once again full of vitality [21: 309]. After the Bosnian Crisis, Britain, France, and Russia further strengthened their relations with each

other; Italy was further alienated from the Triple Alliance and became closely involved with the Triple Entente; the completely broken Austro-Russian relations could not be repaired; and Germany's choice to staunchly support Austria-Hungary during the Crisis completely deprived it of the opportunity to restore friendly relations with Russia. While the rivalry among the Great Powers before the First World War became increasingly intense, Germany, which had dominated the Dual Alliance, eventually became the strongest supporter of the alliance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-1923*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 289 p.
2. Bridge F. R. and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System 1814-1914 (Second Edition)*, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, 376 p.
3. Bernhard Prince von Bülow, *Prince von Bülow Memoirs, 1897-1903*, London and New York: Putnam, 1931, 691 p.
4. Bernhard Prince von Bülow, *Prince von Bülow Memoirs, 1903-1909*, London and New York: Putnam, 1931, 580 p.
5. Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 103-123.
6. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics", *World Politics*, Vol. 36, Issue 4, 1984, pp. 461-495.
7. Gooch G. P. and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 (BD hereafter)*, Vol. 5, London: Johnson Reprint Company Ltd., 1928, 972 p.
8. Henry Wickham Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2008, 340 p.
9. *Houses of Commons Parliamentary Papers., Turkey, No. 2 (1904) Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of South-Eastern Europe*, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1904, 176 p.
10. *Houses of Commons Parliamentary Papers., Turkey, No. 3 (1905) Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of South-Eastern Europe*, London: His

- Majesty's Stationary Office, 1905, 214 p.
11. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914*, New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952, 218 p.
 12. Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy 1871-1914*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 272 p.
 13. Jean Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1700-1918*, London and New York: Routledge, 2014, 342 p.
 14. John Albert White, *Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895-1907*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 369 p.
 15. John Lowe, *The Great Powers, Imperialism, and the German Problem, 1865-1925*, London and New York: Routledge, 1994, 269 p.
 16. Johannes Lepsius and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (Hrsg.), *Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter GP)*, 3. Band, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922, 480 S.
 17. Johannes Lepsius and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (Hrsg.), *GP*, 10. Band, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924, 276 S.
 18. Johannes Lepsius and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (Hrsg.), *GP*, 19. Band, Zweite Hälfte, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927, 332 S.
 19. Johannes Lepsius and Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (Hrsg.), *GP*, 22. Band, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927, 530 S.
 20. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (B DFA hereafter)*, Part I, from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series F, Europe, 1848-1914, Vol. 24, Washington D. C.: University Publications of America, 1991, 399 p.
 21. Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., *B DFA*, Part I, from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War, Series F, Europe, 1848-1914, Vol. 34, Washington D. C.: University Publications of America, 1991, 451 p.
 22. Klaus Hildebrand, *German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer*, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, 272 p.

23. Ministère des affaires étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871-1914) (hereafter DDF), 1re série (1871-1900), Tome 2, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1930, 658 p.
24. Ministère des affaires étrangères, DDF, 1re série (1871-1900), Tome 3, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1931, 584 p.
25. Ministère des affaires étrangères, DDF, 1re série (1871-1900), Tome 6, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1934, 752 p.
26. Ministère des affaires étrangères, DDF, 2e série (1901-1911), Tome 3, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1931, 672 p.
27. Ministère des affaires étrangères, DDF, 2e série (1901-1911), Tome 4, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1932, 622 p.
28. Ministère des affaires étrangères, DDF, 2e série (1901-1911), Tome 6, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1935, 696 p.
29. Ministère des affaires étrangères, DDF, 2e série (1901-1911), Tome 11, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950, 1180 p.
30. Niles Stefan Illich, German Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire: a Comparative Study, Texas: A & M University, 2007, 276 p.
31. Roberts. J. M., Europe 1880-1945 (Third Edition), London and New York: Routledge, 2001, 539 p.
32. Seaman. L. C. B, From Vienna to Versailles, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, 229 p.
33. Seton-Watson R. W, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkan, London: Constable and Company Limited, 1917, 336 p.
34. Seton-Watson. R. W, The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy, London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1911, 494 p.
35. Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment and Production, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 290 p.
36. Sidney Bradshaw Fay, Before Sarajevo: The Origins of the World War (Second Edition), Vol. I, New York: The Free Press, 1966, 342 p.
37. Stephen J. Lee, Imperial Germany, London and New York: Routledge, 2005, 141 p.
38. Taylor A. J. P, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954, 687 p.

39. Taylor A. J. P, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951, 306 p.
40. Victor V. Zaitsev, "Russia, Austro-Hungary and the Problem of Legal Reform in Macedonia in 1907", *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 1995, pp. 31-67.
41. William Simpson and Martin Jones, *Europe 1783-1914 (Third Edition)*, London and New York: Routledge, 2015; 478 p.

**ԵՐԿՅԱԿ ԴԱՇԻՆՔԸ. ԵՐԿԸՆՏՐԱՆՔԻ ՏԵՍՈՒԹՅԱՆ
ՏԵՍԱՆԿՅՈՒՆԻՑ. ՄԱԿԵԴՈՆԱԿԱՆ ԲԱՐԵՓՈԽՈՒՄՆԵՐԻ
ՎՐԱ (1903-1908 ԹԹ.)
ՀԵՆՎՈՂ ՔՆՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

Գառ Ջիանժի

Հիմնաբառեր. Գլեն Ս. Հ. Սնայդեր, Կոնֆեդերացիայի երկընտրանք, Գերմանա-ավստրիական դաշինք, Մակեդոնական բարեփոխում

Ամփոփում

Գերմանա-ավստրիական դաշինքը Գերմանիայի ակտիվ դիվանագիտության կարևոր ձեռքբերումն էր, որը վերացրեց Ավստրո-Հունգարիայի՝ թշնամական երկրի վերածվելու ռիսկը: Գերմանիան վերականգնեց ավստրո-ոուսական հարաբերությունների զսպումը և Ավստրիայի և Ռուսաստանի միջև միջնորդության կարգավիճակը: Այս դաշինքի շնորհիվ Ավստրո-Հունգարիան բարելավեց իր դիրքերը որպես համեմատաբար փխրուն մեծ ուժ Եվրոպայում, սակայն Գերմանիայի հետ իր արտաքին քաղաքականության վրա որոշ սահմանափակումներ դնելու գնով: Գերմանա-ավստրիական դաշինքը հենց սկզբից գտնվում էր ծանր կացության մեջ: Գերմանիան եւ Ավստրիան անհանգստացած էին «մեկուսացված» լինելու հեռանկարի պատճառով: Կար նաև թշնամական երկրների հետ մերձեցման և հակամարտության վտանգ: Դաշինքի ներսում հարաբերությունները բարելավելու նպատակով Ավստրո-Հունգարիան օգտվում էր մակեդոնական բարեփոխումներից՝ ակտիվ արտաքին քաղաքականություն որդեգրելու համար: Դաշինքի կայունությունը պահպանելու համար Գերմանիան աջակցում էր Ավստրո-Հունգարիայի վարած քաղաքականությանը Մակեդոնիայի բարեփոխումների գործընթացում բազմաթիվ վճռորոշ պահերին՝ դաշնակիցների հանդեպ իր հավատարմությունը ցույց տալու համար: Գերմանիայի եւ Ավստրիայի միջև դաշինքի առաջնային և երկրորդական հարաբերությունները աստիճանաբար փոխվեցին, ինչն էլ իր հերթին դրդեց Ավստրո-Հունգարիային ավելի ակտիվ և ինքնավստահ արտաքին քաղաքականություն վարել: